East Anglian Flying Services operated in a post-war era when air crashes were far from infrequent compared with the aviation safety record of 21st Century. Despite the airline having a fleet of mixed origins, mostly bought at advantageous prices, and a policy of maximising seating, the safety record remained good throughout its history. There were several incidents with undercarriages, a trio of runway over-runs in wet conditions and the tragic death of an engineer who was working on the undercarriage of a C-47 at Southend. In a further unusual incident, a Viscount 812 crashed during a proving flight for the issue of a CofA. None of the air crew died but, unfortunately, two Aviation Traders staff working on the ground at Southend were killed. There was, however, only one serious crash which resulted in a multiple loss of life of crew and passengers and that occurred on Sunday, May 6th 1962 at St.Boniface Down, Isle of Wight, when Dakota G-AGZB crashed into high ground while flying between Jersey and Portsmouth.
The accident weighed heavily on the airline’s staff as was indicated by a thick file of documents and correspondence labeled ‘ZB’ found ten years after the accident in the documents room of the old Tradair hangar at Southend. The brief history given here uses four main sources:
* The official Ministry of Aviation accident investigation report which contains all the essential facts but little extra detail.
* The Channel Airways report compiled by Chief Pilot Sidney Walsh and the airline’s ‘ZB’ file.
* Newspapers of the day. As with much journalism, the facts presented aren’t always correct.
* The website www.farvis.co.uk/2013site which has been extensively researched by Ross Floyd and adds extra detail.
I have included the names of some of those involved as they were chronicled in the newspapers of the day and documented in the official report.
FACTS & SPECULATION:
Today’s internet society thrives on speculation and I have ignored the majority of this as it can be as baseless as some of the print journalism of the day. It should be noted that the accident report sought to investigate the causes of the tragedy and also highlight any improvements which should be made to make aviation safer. While Channel Airways did attract some criticism in the official report, this was mostly related to the documentation provided to their aircrew as part of the company-specific operations manual. This had become a mandatory item for the issue of an Air Operators Certificate since the 1960 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Bill had passed into law (1) and improvements to the evolving documentation were recommended. Secondly, the accident report suggested that scheduled passenger flights should be restricted to ‘aerodromes which have radio communications facilities’. It is amazing that, in 1962, this wasn’t already a requirement. Neither of these findings was considered by the Accidents Investigation Branch (AIB) to be a direct cause of the accident and, for this reason, neither Channel Airways nor Portsmouth Airport/ Council were specifically recommended to bring legal representation to the enquiry.
(1) The September 1958 crash of an Independent Air Transport Viking at Southall had prompted the requirement for airlines to have an Air Operators Certificate and an Operations Manual which formalised operating procedures and behaviours. Channel had been issued with an AOC in March 1961 but it was only in January 1962 that the Air Ministry queried some aspects of the airline documentation, including minimum weather criteria.
THE BACKGROUND:
On Saturday May 5th 1962, the Channel Islands had been completely fog-bound all day and Channel Airways flights to and from Portsmouth and Southend had been cancelled. The scheduled flights from Southend / Channel Islands and Portsmouth/ Channel Islands for Sunday May 6th were all fully subscribed by pre-booked passengers and transfers from the Saturday cancellations. Given the overflow of passengers needing to travel, it was decided that G-AGZB would fly an extra Southend/ Portsmouth/ Guernsey/ Jersey service with the excess passengers heading for the Islands. The Dakota would then return Jersey to Portsmouth with further overflow passengers before positioning Portsmouth to Southend. As this was an additional flight, the airline rostered their standby crew for G-AGZB. Prior to following the timeline, it is useful to consider the facilities at Portsmouth and also the procedures which Channel Airways aircrew followed for landing at Portsmouth in both fine and inclement weather.
PORTSMOUTH AIRPORT:
The City of Portsmouth purchased 276 acres of Portsea Island in 1930 and spent 2 years draining and leveling the land, constructing a control tower, three grass runways, two hangars and customs facilities. After an opening extravaganza which attracted over 100 aircraft and the Graf Zeppelin airship, commercial air services were inaugurated to the Isle of Wight and beyond. In 1933, Neville Shute Norway’s Airspeed factory was established at the site and went on to design and manufacture aircraft and the Horsa glider throughout World War 2. Aircraft construction and servicing boomed throughout the war, partially compensating for the loss of air services. In the 1950s, the trend reversed with Airspeed shifting their activities to sites owned by their new parent company, De Havilland, and East Anglian Flying Services moving in to establish schedules to the Channel Islands, Paris, Southend and the Isle of Wight. While the airline invested in the airport, building a terminal with catering and new customs facilities, the austerity of the post-war years seems to have deterred any further investment by the City Council.
Channel Airways/ East Anglian Flying Services had been operating into Portsmouth since 1953 initially using a cloud base criterion of at least 1500′ and a visibility of greater than 2000 yards as their minimum weather parameters for landing. In March 1961, the RAF gave permission for civil flights to use Ground Control Approach (GCA) radar facilities at Thorney Island, around 11 kilometres east of Portsmouth. Additionally, Thorney Island could provide Instrument Landing System (ILS) facilities. Critically, as with many armed forces facilities, no services were offered on Sundays meaning that neither ILS nor GCA could be used by Channel Airways. Even when fully operational, the technology was referenced only to Thorney Island and not to Portsmouth Airport.
Channel’s procedure for landing at Portsmouth in conditions of poor visibility was to use Thorney Island’s Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) to make a controlled descent through cloud while in a corridor clear of obstructions. This clear sector led south-east from the RAF base, out over Selsey Bill and the sea. Once an airliner had successfully broken through the cloud into clear visibility, the Captain would proceed under visual flying conditions towards Portsmouth. Since 1961, Channel had changed their weather criteria to take advantage of the newly-available RAF nav-aid which they considered would enable safe approaches during more borderline visibility. The minimum conditions were reduced to a 500′ cloud base and 1200 yards runway visual range (RVR) for the Dakotas, even less for the DH Doves; this was clearly far less than in earlier years.
TIMELINE TO TRAGEDY: Times are GMT.
06:15 First Officer Fitzakerly departs Rotterdam in Channel Dakota G-AMDZ, en route to Southend.
07:20 G-AMDZ arrives Southend, FO Eric Fitzakerly is re-scheduled to fly to Jersey on G-AGZB.
09:37 G-AGZB departs Southend for Portsmouth & Jersey.
10:25 Weather during flight over Southern England completely overcast. The Captain obtains clearance from RAF Tangmere to use the Non-directional beacon at RAF Thorney Island during let-down to break cloud cover prior to (planned) continuation to land at Portsmouth.
10:32 Captain Diesbach confirms that it hasn’t been possible to safely break cloud cover at Thorney; request to London Flight Information to file airborne flight plan for Jersey.
11:30 G-AGZB arrives Guernsey.
11:35 Captain calls Channel Ops to report that they couldn’t land at Portsmouth. Reportedly originally told to fly Guernsey to Jersey with all Guernsey passengers bound for Portsmouth & Southend and then proceed directly to Southend (2).
12:25 G-AGZB lands at Jersey.
13:00 (approx.) Channel Airways Dakota G-AJIB flown by Captain W.Hankin departs Jersey on the scheduled flight to Portsmouth. Flying at 2500′ to the Thorney Island beacon, Hankin successfully follows cloud-break procedure and continues to land at Portsmouth (where the weather is within limits) at 14:05 (approx).
13:40 G-AGZB Captain visits Jersey Met Office to obtain Channel Islands & London/ South Coast forecast from 12:00 to 17:00.
13:48 G-AGZB requests permission from Jersey Tower to taxi to holding point. Tower replies to give clearance & inform aircraft that local pressure setting for altimeter is 1003 Mbar.
13:53 Clearance given for take-off; wind given as 20 kts from 220.
13:56 ‘ZB cleared to climb to flight level 30 (3000’). VHF frequency given for Jersey Information.
13:57 ‘ZB contacts Jersey Information (JI) to give ETA over Alderney of 14:03 based on (incorrect) take-off time of 13:49.
13:58 ‘ZB contacts JI to give revised Alderney ETA of 14:08 based on corrected take-off time of 13:54.
14:29 Aircraft strikes high ground at St.Boniface Down. Channel’s Chief Pilot later reported that the clock in the instrument panel was stopped at 14:19. Unless this was due to crash trauma, the observation is probably incorrect.
14:37 Channel Dakota G-AJIB taxiing for take-off at Portsmouth (en route to Jersey) asks LFI whether a Channel Dakota arrival at Portsmouth is imminent.
15:40 Channel Airways Portsmouth Station Manager, Mr P.Hook, calls Southend operations: G-AGZB one hour overdue and news received of an aircraft crash.
15:45 Southern Air Traffic Control notify Air Ministry.
15:55 Station Manager notifies airline of the crash and the number of casualties.
(2) These details are taken from a notebook for in Channel’s ‘ZB’ file (see below). The provenance of the notebook is unknown but the reverse side of the sheet has a carbon imprint of Jack Jones signature.
THE TRAGEDY UNFOLDS ON THE GROUND:
The Dakota smashed into the fog-obscured side of St Boniface Down at a height of 717′ at 14:29 GMT. In the words of the Accident Investigation Branch (AIB), it then ‘bounced and ploughed’ up the rising gorse-clad hillside, broaching a high wire fence which surrounded a disused RAF radar site (3). Coming to rest around 250 metres ahead of the initial impact, the aircraft had left a trail of structural debris, luggage and fresh flowers across the hillside. The Dakota was, unfortunately, well provided with fuel and the fire which broke-out upon impact destroyed much of the aircraft leaving only the tail and parts of the wings untouched (4). Built-up areas of Ventnor were less than a kilometre away but the dense fog left most citizens unaware of the crash. Fortunately, 36-year old local man Ted Price was working on the Down with his dog Rover and heard the ‘crunching sound’ of the Dakota’s impact. Running 100 metres to the crash site, he scaled the remnants of the radar station fence and ran to where three casualties, two women and a man, were lying on the grass. The elder woman had leg injuries and told Price that her husband was still within the fuselage. He bravely raced into the burning wreckage to rescue the badly-burned stewardess Pam Groves whom he carried to safety, clear of the debris and the searing-hot ground. Ted then saw another woman in the flames and raced back in to rescue her as well despite scalding heat and ongoing small explosions. Spotting a man, apparently blinded, staggering out of the other side of the wreckage, he led him through the scattered boxes of blue irises and yellow daffodils to join the others. The injured were beginning to feel the cold in the damp fog and Ted Price attempted to safeguard them by piling a couple of aircraft seats around them and covering them with cardboard from the flower boxes. He then headed off to summon help but, on the way, found a seventh survivor, a badly-injured man, staggering around near the old guardroom. Taking him to join the others, he had to resist their pleas for him to remain with them and he headed-off down the road to look for help. By lucky coincidence, the Northampton Short Wave Radio Club had set-up their radio equipment barely 200 metres from the crash site. They were taking part in a Civil Defence exercise but found themselves in the middle of a real emergency when Ted Price appeared through the fog with news of the crash. The ‘Hams’ had heard the crash as a dull thud ‘like a car door slamming’ and, upon being briefed by Price, they transmitted an Emergency Mayday call. The first emergency services vehicle to arrive was a non-radio police car and, they too, were keen to enlist the help of the radio enthusiasts. Driving right up to the crash site, the radio team were able to use their 2 metre mobile radio transmitter to contact fellow ‘Hams’ on the mainland at Netley and Farnham and they, in turn, were able to pass information directly to the Isle of Wight emergency services. Ambulance, fire and further police services were swiftly on the scene (5). The Fire Service worked to damp-down the ashes and cool the ground surrounding the wreckage. As the fuel tanks had already exploded, no foam was used and this made subsequent crash interpretation much easier.
(3) The radar chain on the Isle of Wight was an important part of Britain’s early warning system during WW2 and accounted for the several Luftwaffe raids on Ventnor. The Dakota struck near the base of one of the western towers which had supported the masts (removed) and ended-up 250m away and 22 metres higher up the hill, across the site’s perimeter road, alongside the public highway.
(4) According to the Channel Airways technical log, G-AGZB was carrying 350 gallons of fuel upon departing Jersey, sufficient for four hours flying.
(5) Newspaper reports from the Times, Daily express, Daily Sketch, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail and the Evening News have been used to compile the crash scene details. In some cases, there is conflicting detail and the majority of the narrative is from the Evening News of May 7th 1962.
Ambulances and doctors attended the survivors, six being transported to the County Hospital in Ryde and one to St. Mary’s Hospital in Newport. Surgeons were drafted-in to the County and worked in the operating theatre until 01:00 on May 7th. The two women suffering from severe burns were transferred to Salisbury’s Odstock Hospital, a unit specialising in plastic surgery, on May 7th and were joined by 34-year old George Owen the following day. Mrs Marks, in St.Mary’s, was noted to be making ‘satisfactory progress’. Her husband, Frederick, died in the crash. The three survivors remaining in the County Hospital remained poorly but showed signs of recovery. Tragically, the same couldn’t be said of the two ladies transferred to Salisbury: the stewardess, 23-year old Pamela Groves, died on May 10th and passenger Mrs Brenda Boucher the following day. Mrs Boucher’s husband and baby son had also perished in the disaster. The Gardiner family was also shattered by the crash: 25-year old Susan Gardiner died along with her two-year old son Peter and baby David. Her husband, a Captain in the Royal Marines, was traveling home by sea with the family car. 20-year old Wendy Vernall had been married for just over a week and was returning from her honeymoon on Jersey with her new husband, naval rating John Vernall. Mrs Vernall had tried to drag her husband from the aircraft but she had multiple fractures of her right leg and he had proved too heavy to move. Mr Vernall died in the wreckage. Sixteen year-old Marilyn Drew, a high school student from Gosport, was returning from spending her Easter holiday with a friend on Jersey; she, too, died in the crash. Of the injured, George Owen survived after treatment at Odstock; Mr Peter Clarke and Mr Henry Davin also recovered from their injuries. Indeed, on May 8th, Mr Davin was able to brief Channel Airways Chief Pilot, Captain Sidney Walsh, that the Dakota had been flying normally until he heard power being applied suddenly, then shut-off again immediately before impact. Studying the photographs of the wreckage, it is amazing that five out of the seventeen on board managed to survive.
SITE INVESTIGATION:
The emergency plan for the Isle of Wight seemed to have worked well with the emergency services arriving promptly and the necessary assistance being swiftly given to the injured. Those who, tragically, were beyond help were transferred to a temporary morgue to await examination by the Island Pathologist assisted by Air Ministry staff. The Accident Investigation Branch of the Ministry of Aviation despatched investigators to examine the wreckage and, on May 7th, senior Channel Airways management drove to Ventnor. Squadron Leader Jones, Chief Engineer T.Atkins and Chief Pilot Sidney Walsh visited the crash site to carry-out their own examination in parallel to the AIB investigation.
In his report, the Channel Airways Chief Pilot noted that G-AGZB had struck a section of hillside which was sloping upwards at around 20 degrees from the horizontal. Nonetheless, impact damage to the tail wheel and engine nacelles suggested that the C-47 was, itself, at a steep angle of attack, possibly stalled, as the pilot in command desperately tried to climb steeply on high power. Flaps and undercarriage were fully retracted and much of the wreckage had been destroyed by fire. Neither the control panel nor the central pedestal had been burned-out, which enabled the Channel team to examine the instrument settings. The Channel report states that the clock had stopped at 14:19 but, as the crash happened at 14:29, this initially seems like an error transcribing the Chief Pilot’s notes. However, 14:19 is repeated in more than one place in the notes, which is strange. the Captain’s altimeter had been set to 1004.5 Mb and the First Officer’s to 1003 Mb: these values conform very closely to the values supplied by London FIR and Jersey Information. The Captain’s altimeter gave a height reading of 725′ which is close to the surveyed height of 717′ (above MSL) at the impact point. None of the instruments recording the aircraft’s heading were considered reliable owing to the damage sustained and the C-47’s heading could be best-estimated as 060 degrees (T) from the track of debris across the hillside. The autopilot was disengaged, confirming that the aircraft was being flown by hand, the fuel cross-feed control was off but both fuel tank selectors had broken-off making it impossible to know which fuel tank was in use. The mixture controls on the throttle pedestal were both in auto lean and the trim controls were at zero (elevator), one quarter degree, right wing low (aileron) and one half degree nose left (rudder). These settings all suggested that the engines, fuel system and propellers were all performing correctly. The radio navigation selector boxes could not be located, so it was impossible to determine which beacon had been selected in the ADF direction-finding equipment nor whether it was in use.
THE ENQUIRY:
The Ministry of Aviation Accidents Investigation Branch followed-up the site inspection with a thorough investigation which ran through possible direct and indirect causes of the accident. The first requirement was to provide technical information for the inquest which was to be held at the Guildhall, Newport, on September 25th 1962. The final report was issued in August 1963.
SUBJECTS FOR INVESTIGATION:
THE AIRCRAFT:
History: – Dakota G-AGZB, construction number 12180, was a Douglas C-47A-1-DK built as part of a USAAF contract as 42-92385 at the Oklahoma City plant and delivered on 29th December 1943. Supplied to the RAF as FZ624 under the Lend/ Lease scheme as a Dakota III, the aircraft was ferried to Dorval, Montreal, on January 24th 1944. Reaching Britain on 19th February, FZ624 was allocated to 48 Squadron at Down Ampney, Gloucestershire, on 26th February 1944. It took part in D-Day Operation Tonga on June 5th/ 6th 1944 dropping 15 troops and 2 containers over Normandy. Later, on June 6th, the same aircraft and crew towed a Horsa glider to Normandy as part of Operation Mallard. FZ624 was also heavily involved in the Market Garden operation in September 1944, towing a glider carrying 1st Airborne troops to Landing Zone ‘S’ at Arnhem on the second lift on September 18th. Further operations to Arnhem Drop Zone ‘V’ were flown by various crews in FZ624 on September 20th, 21st and 23rd. The Rhine Crossing, Operation Varsity, in March 1945 was the last major operation for both 48 Squadron and FZ624. When 48 Squadron departed for India in summer 1945, FZ624 moved to 1336 (Transport Squadron) Conversion Unit at Welford where it was probably involved in giving training to the ex-Halifax pilots of 10 Squadron.
Following civilianisation, the Dakota was registered G-AGZB and moved to the nascent British European Airways flying for Railway Air Services/ Scottish Airways from 3rd March 1946 and BEA itself from 18th March 1947. G-AGZB took part in BEA’s major upgrade of 38 C-47s to ‘Pionair’ status which was carried-out by Scottish Aviation at Prestwick during the 1950s. Although the Pionairs had more modern avionics, seating and galley than the straight C-47, BEA phased them out during the late fifties in favour of turboprop equipment. G-AGZB was given the honour of flying the final passenger schedule out of London when she was flown to Birmingham on October 31st 1960 by the Pionair Flight Manager. Unfortunately, it was a foggy morning and ‘ZB, landing too far down the runway at Elmdon, was unable to stop in time and ran off the end of the runway through a picket fence. Fortunately, only pride was injured, but G-AGZB was substantially damaged. By coincidence, around seven months earlier, a Don Everall Dakota had experienced a similar mishap, also at Elmdon, and had sustained similar damage, but to the opposite side of the airframe. Channel Airways bought the two aircraft and trucked G-AGZB, plus usable components form G-AMSF, to BKS Engineering at Southend. BKS rebuilt G-AGZB during the winter of 1960 and it emerged from their hangar on 18th April 1961, entering service two days later. With its hybrid origins, the AIB would have been very keen to check the Dakota’s service records, certification and possible indications of technical faults. No issues were discovered.
One of the AIB’s initial requests to Channel was for photographs of the Dakota instrument panel. Channel sent them a selection of photos of G-AGNK’s cockpit. ‘NK was also an ex-BEA Pionair and the instrument layout was very similar to that of G-AGZB.
Technical Status:
* G-AGZB’s Certificate of Airworthiness was current having been renewed in April 1962 at 21,671 flying hours. It had flown only 89 hours in the intervening month.
* A copy of Channel’s submission to Lloyds of London gives ‘total hours since last overhaul’ as 870.47 for the airframe, both engines and one propeller to midnight May 5th 1962.
* The maintenance of the airframe, engines and propellers had been carried-out to the appropriate schedule and all components were within allotted hours. BKS Engineering had completed a Check IV prior to delivery of the rebuilt Dakota in April 1961.
* Starboard P&W Twin Wasp engine s/n 360486 had flown 12,692 hours since new; port Twin Wasp s/n 15835 had completed 13,311 hours.
* Hamilton Standard Hydromatic propeller hours were 13.791 on the port and 16,590 on the starboard.
* The aircraft’s radio equipment had been surveyed by the Air Registration Board during the CofA renewal and the appropriate licence issued. The Dakota was equipped with ILS (Instrument Landing System) and ADF equipment. The ADF had been calibrated on 11th April 1962. The magnetic compass had last been swung on 30th April 1962.
* The instrument recordings on the last technical log sheet all indicated normal operation. No defects were recorded on the Tech Log completed prior to departing from Jersey.
* The load sheet for departure from Jersey indicated that the laden weight of 11644 kg was under the maximum permitted all-up-weight of 12,727 kg. The centre of gravity of the laden aircraft was withing the permitted parameters between 252″ and 258″ aft of the aircraft datum.
* There was no evidence of any pre-crash defect in the aircraft or its installed equipment.
The crew:
Captain Philip de Diesbach, 36, had joined Channel Airways from BKS Air Transport on April 1st 1961. He held an Airline Transport Pilots Licence endorsed with the DC-3 in group I and a current Instrument Rating. His flying hours totalled 7060 with 3675 hours recorded as second pilot on BKS DC-3s and 600 hours in command of a DC-3. One of his first jobs upon joining Channel Airways had been to collect the rebuilt G-AGZB from BKS’s Southend engineering facility and take it for a 17 minute test flight on April 18th 1961. He had completed his most recent six-monthly competency check on the Dakota on April 10th 1962 and also passed emergency drill checks on the same day. Channel records show that his annual route check had been completed on 4th December 1961 and included Southend to Jersey, Guernsey and Portsmouth as well as both Shoreham and Portsmouth to the Channel Islands. Instrument let-down procedures had been carried-out at Guernsey, Jersey and Southend but had not been observed at Thorney Island. The airline records show that Captain Diesbach had flown between Jersey and Portsmouth on 96 occasions.
First Officer Eric Fitzakerly, 37, had served in the RAF where he spent many hours flying Dakotas with Transport Command. After a spell in commerce, he moved to civil aviation and obtained a Commercial Licence, endorsed with the DC-3 in Group II, and current Instrument Rating. Joining Channel Airways on March 1st 1962, he had completed a competency test on the DC-3 on 19th Match and was reported to be an enthusiastic and competent pilot with above-average abilities as a First Officer. His total flying time was 4150 hours of which 70 had been completed as second pilot on a Channel Airways DC-3 (the Channel report submitted to Lloyds of London gave a total flying time of 6450 hours of which 5105 hours had been on Dakotas).
Stewardess Pamela Groves, 23, had joined Channel Airways in March 1961 and had successfully completed a safety assessment on 9th February 1962.
Crew considerations:
Having confirmed that the crew were suitably licensed, the AIB will have checked their medicals, flying hours and training. All had valid licences, medicals and suitable emergency and operational training for passenger operations on DC-3s on the routes between Portsmouth, Southend, Jersey and Guernsey. First Officer Fitzakerly had checked-out on Dakota G-AGNK after joining Channel in March 1962. Captain Diesbach had completed a six-monthly type check with Channel Airways Training Captain, H.McDonnell, during a 20 minute flight in G-AMDZ on April 10th 1962. The test included instrument flying, the operation of nav aids and the use of ADF equipment. Engine failure, propeller feathering, engine fire procedure, single-engine landing and emergency evacuation were among the conditions tested. Captain Diesbach readily passed this test having had some ‘exam nerves’ on an earlier check in the company of an Air Ministry official.
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