
Some aviation histories dismiss Channel Airways as a rather random operator, cobbling together a motley set of short haul routes and a bargain basement fleet. While Freddie Laker has been lauded as the ‘Del Boy’ of the era, his Southend neighbour, Jack Jones, is often painted as more of a Harold Steptoe. This is very far from the truth: although the airline was a product of the times, it was an early instigator of many operational procedures still valued by the budget airlines of today.
East Anglian Flying Services’ early operations echoed those of many other post-war companies working at the simplest level: cheap, war surplus single and twin-engined aircraft, ad hoc passenger, freight and joy riding services with just a couple of pilots and very low overheads. Many of these outfits went out of business quickly but EAFS managed to navigate the post-war government’s attempts to crush independent airlines in favour of state-owned companies. Jack Jones and his fellow directors adopted a hard-working, utilitarian ethic and they were able to interface with BEA’s near monopoly by becoming an associate company. EAFS operated into airports which BEA felt it didn’t need to serve: Southend, Rochester and Ipswich all met this criterion. The first fleet was composed of Dragon Rapides, a mainstay of many small regional operators in the fifties. EAFS’s business plan remained resolutely low-level with pleasure flights operated by the ‘airline’ directors. They also had aspirations to promote flying training with a second fleet – ex-RAF Percival Proctors (1). Southend had been chosen as a base and Ipswich airport/ airfield was purchased to support their light aviation plans. This evolution was very similar to Derby Airways/ British Midland’s ongoing development at Burnaston and Air Kruise’s growth at Ramsgate and Lympne. The second string of the early business plan was the operation as a BEA associate plus ambitions to fly cross-channel passenger services to destinations such as Ostend, Le Touquet and Paris. The choice of Southend as a base and these continental routes would shortly provide EAFS with their bedrock income as well as their new identity as ‘Channel’ Airways. In addition to the English Channel, the name was to reflect the Southend-based operator’s other zone of interest: the Channel Islands.
Jack Jones early purchases had been very hand-to-mouth. Sometimes, the acquisition of several cheap aircraft was partially bankrolled by the sale of one of the purchases. Once EAFS had moved beyond RAF-surplus sales, the purchase policy remained the same for decades. When a suitable new type of aircraft had been identified, EAFS waited until a well-maintained fleet came to the market. One or many aircraft were then bought in a package which sometimes included spare parts or supplementary aircraft which could be used for spares. DH Doves were acquired from the West African Airways Corporationin successive years during the mid-fifties followed by two Bristol Freighters from the same source (2). BEA supplied nine Dakotas and, subsequently, a nice fleet of early Viscount 700s. The latter purchase, in the early sixties, also promoted a new Channel business practice – the leasing-out of aircraft not immediately needed for daily operation. Channel’s highest profile fleet acquisition followed during 1966 and 1967 when eleven ex-Continental Viscount 812s arrived from the USA. While some of these were immediately leased-out, this era formed the peak of Channel’s operations.
(1) Jack Jones’ purchase of four ex-RAF Proctors might be seen as a mis-step but, in comparison with Southend’s other great entrepreneur, Freddie Laker, the deal was a minor error. As proprietor of Aviation Traders (Engineering) Ltd. he bought the RAF’s entire fleet of Prentice trainers when they came up for disposal – 252 aircraft scattered all around the UK. The large trainers failed to appeal to civilian buyers and only around twenty were sold. By the time Laker sold AT(E)L and Air Charter to Airwork, he still had fifty or so potentially available for sale – the balance had already been scrapped or parted-out. Airwork generously estimated their worth to be 40,000 pounds but they were doomed to become scrap. ‘Fly me, I’m Freddie’ by Roger Eglin and Berry Ritchie, Times Newspapers, 1980.
(2) Admittedly, WAAC had experienced some safety issues and one of their three B170s had crashed during a tropical storm. Acknowledged Bristol Freighter experts Aviation Traders assessed the fleet and were then hired to maintain the remaining two aircraft from a base in Accra.

When the airline departed from the second-hand policy, the change of direction proved prejudicial to Channel’s future. With a couple of notable (and very successful) exceptions, Jack Jones had chosen products of the British aircraft industry. In the late sixties, he signed agreements for three types of brand-new aircraft. Despite the intensive capital investment required, none of the three types proved to be as successful for Channel as they did for other operators. The HS748s never really hit their stride and proved to be oversold regarding their grass field capability. Channel would have done better by prolonging the Dakota operation between airfields such as Portsmouth, Ipswich and Rochester and then, perhaps, evolved via the Heron fleet (added later) to something more robust and modern like a Twin Otter. The BAC 1-11 proved very successful for many airlines, less so for Channel, perhaps owing to Southend Airport’s reluctance to move with the times by extending at least one runway. The HS Tridents may have been offered at a temptingly low price, but they didn’t prove to be a long-term bargain. Initially, they boosted Channel’s image as a modern jet operator but they were never really appropriate and the delivery package was low on spares and ancillary equipment. Channel’s last fleet purchase attempted to emulate past second-hand success. However, the ex-BEA/ Olympic Comet 4s were high-hour jets in quite scruffy condition and, again, came with insufficient spares.
Channel had other distinctive business characteristics linked to the hardware. Seating density was just about the highest of any airline, sometimes to eyebrow-raising levels. The Viking fleet could accommodate 40 passengers, the Dakotas around the same while the Bristol Freighters and the DC-4 managed to cram-in 53 and 88 passengers respectively. The Viscounts were no less accommodating: 700 series aircraft were spacious enough for 68 to 71 passengers while Continental’s comfortable 52-seater Viscount 812s were fitted with an additional thirty seats. The potentially commodious aspects of their aircraft were promoted by BAC and Hawker Siddeley when promoting the 1-11 and the Trident. Channel’s first 1-11 was a 400 series aircraft which could handle 89 seats. It was returned when the second and third aircraft on order, ‘408s’, were delivered. These were also 400 series 1-11s but the design had been tweaked to Channel’s demands to accommodate an extra ten seats. In the event, Channel might have been better off waiting for the 500 series which could transport 119 passengers. The Tridents sold to Channel were 1Es modified for the airline as ‘140s’. These had strengthened floors and additional emergency exits to permit extra seating. The configuration included a much-mocked 7-abreast ‘family seat’ row which skimped on minor accessories such as arm rests. This demonstrated another Channel Airways characteristic: there would be no fripperies on the low-cost, high density services.
The issues with cramped accommodation weren’t linked to safety, merely comfort; in the few cases where Channel had experienced emergency evacuations after incidents, the cabin attendants had accomplished de-planing quickly and safely. Channel did suffer a few crashes, two with fatalities, but none were really attributable to their fleet or the seating intensity. One feature of Channel’s early operations which was questioned by critics following accidents was their reputation for flying in marginal weather conditions, especially into primitive airfields. Portsmouth Airport was the main culprit: the fatal 1962 crash on the Isle of Wight was while the Dakota was flying too low in cloud while heading for Portsmouth. In August 1967, two Channel HS748s were involved in accidents at Portsmouth on the same day. Both slid-off the runway in incidents which questioned the HS748’s performance on wet grass surfaces. There was also an undercarriage incident with Viscount G-AVJL at Basle – also on the same day in August! Undercarriage malfunctions were also experienced with a Viscount at Palma in 1966 and a Viking at Southend in 1959. Weather was, again, a major factor in May 1968 when Viscount 812 G-APPU failed to stop while landing at a very rainy Southend. Pilot error was partly blamed – also the case on the second Channel crash which resulted in fatalities. Viscount G-AVJZ was written-off on a test flight from Southend in 1967 when there were issues feathering one of the propellers on take-off. The Viscount crashed into the ground, killing two AT(E)L engineers working in a storeroom.

Channel also operated a serious maintenance base at, firstly, Southend and, subsequently, also at Stansted. Tradair had also earned a good reputation for maintenance and their staff and spares inventory for Vikings was incorporated into Channel’s operations in 1962. The Southend facility wasn’t as comprehensive as Dan-Air’s base at Lasham and didn’t offer services to third parties but it seemed equal to keeping a very varied fleet operational until the final days in the 1970s. Despite many and varied aircraft types, Channel did maintain a degree of uniformity: Gypsy Queen and Six engines were an early standard item while the Freighters and Vikings were both Hercules-engined and the DC-4 and C-47s were, of course, Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp powered. Moving to the turboprops, the Rolls Royce Dart reigned supreme and even the 1-11s and Tridents had versions of the RR Spey turbofans. The Comets introduced in the final days, however, used Rolls-Royce Avon engines.

Jack Jones commented that fast turn-arounds were necessary as his aircraft didn’t make money when they were on the ground. That’s something Ryanair’s Michael O’Leary will agree with today. However, Channel’s early operating mode involved the entire fleet being laid-up over winter months at Southend. Even Channel’s scheduled routes were heavily dependent on the summer holiday industry and, during the early sixties, winter was a time for maintenance, taking bookings and preparing for spring. This was only viable with a fleet which was extensively depreciated and was never going to work with the capital intensive BAC 1-11, Trident or even the HS748. As Channel became more and more involved in the Inclusive Tour industry, this extreme seasonality remained pronounced. Even aircraft such as the DC-4 might disappear into the maintenance hangar in October and not reappear until April. Channel’s attempts to mitigate this weren’t as thorough as some other airlines. Their link-up with Clarksons promoted early season starts for the Dutch bulb field visits and there was some attempt at promoting year-round city visits. However, the prevalent economic climate and currency exchange regulations certainly didn’t help. Ski trips were briefly promoted but Channel’s prime schedules to Jersey and Guernsey, Ostend and Paris remained spring and summer destinations. Rotterdam was a major city destination which had potential for year-round services and the ‘Scottish Flyer’ was intended to provide non-seasonal income. However, even with feeder routes added to Norwich and Liverpool and the local custom of the Ford Motor Company, the latter routes didn’t produce the necessary yield. Despite having the two Bristol Freighters, Channel never really maximised their potential for general cargo although sporadic freight charters proved remunerative. Specialist car ferry services were discussed several times but, probably fortunately, these were left to the dedicated experts Silver City/ Channel Air Bridge/ BAF. Aer Lingus and BKS also dipped their toes into this market but failed to make money.

Channel also adopted the mixed mode bus/ aircraft model pioneered by Skyways Coach-Air. It avoided some of the licensing limitations and promoted cheaper tickets to diverse city destinations. The airline’s feeder services were largely geared to Eastern England with Rochester and Ipswich services funneling passengers into the Southend routes in particular. As an isolated city, Norwich deserved promotion but routes linking East Anglia to east Midlands, the North East, Liverpool and Scotland failed to achieve their potential.
The airline’s coach company, appropriately named Channel Coachways, worked in conjunction with Eastern National and Premier Travel to transport passengers to Southend from Essex, Suffolk and Hertfordshire towns.

It could also be suggested that Channel didn’t make the most from their fleet. While the Vikings were operated pretty much to their time limit, the fleet of Dakotas was added late and retired quite early. the Freighters, too, were sometimes laid-up for extensive periods and retired with quite low hours. Even with some early retirements being cannibalised for spares, it seems that there would have been potential to sell-on some of the final examples of types such as the C-47 and the Viscount 812; instead, they were left to rot away at Southend. The purchase and subsequent sale of the ex-BEA Viscount 700 series fleet seems to have gone well with the majority going to Cambrian after a couple of years of successful operation or leasing. This must surely have been more beneficial than the disposal of the 812 series Viscounts? Dan-Air seems to have done better at managing and prolonging the life of quite a diverse series of aircraft types: Dakotas, Ambassadors, HS748s and Comets while Skyways Cargo kept their C-47 fleet flying for over ten years more than Channel.
Ultimately then, Channel’s business model was far more diverse than many credited. The twin strands of short-range cross-channel schedules and longer range Inclusive Tour flights were the breadwinners. Attempts to create a more general UK-wide scheduled network weren’t successful, car ferry, operations and transatlantic affinity charters weren’t pursued. Coach Air and day trips remained useful and freight was carried but not prioritised. The Company did reasonably well with its own in-house holiday companies, Mediterranean Holidays and Trident. Squadron Leader Jones and his fellow directors built a successful airline based on hard work, frugal purchasing policies and their own capital. The jet age fleet demanded by IT travel agents required jet age financing provided by a rich parent company or by a stock market listing. Channel benefited from neither and was unable to support the payments on modern equipment. Jack Jones, however, was nothing if not ambitious: a painting of Concorde in Channel colours hung in their office for many years. And, yes, it was in the famous golden plumage……
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